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Implementation of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures:  The First Two Years
Donna Roberts
*
Technological innovations together with policies that progressively reduced trade barriers have
shrunk economic distances between nations in the post-World War II era.  This deepening integration
of world markets has blurred the lines of the formerly sharp distinctions drawn between “domestic”
and “international” policies.  In the past, the predominant view was that domestic policies should be
determined by the preferences of the nation’s citizens, with little regard to any effects they might have
on other countries.  More recently, the exponential growth in world-wide trade flows has inevitably
led to closer international scrutiny of the differences that were formerly overlooked among domestic
policies of nations.
  
Of the domestic polices now subject to international scrutiny, technical barriers--measures that
sometimes restrict imports to prevent entry of products that fail to meet the health, quality, safety,
compatibility, or environmental standards of importing countries--were among the first to attract
attention.  The consensus view that emerged was that the enforcement mechanism of these policies,
which is to restrict unsatisfactory imports, made them in many instances indistinguishable from
explicit trade policies that likewise limited entry of goods at the border.  Consequently, the
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreed to negotiate
disciplines on the preparation, adoption and application of these measures beginning with the 1973-
1979 Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations.  Multilateral disciplines on the use of technical barriers
were subsequently expanded and strengthened in the 1986-1993 Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade3
Negotiations which culminated in the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(hereinafter the WTO Agreement).     
From the perspective of trade in primary and processed agricultural products, some of the most
important new disciplines are found in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.  SPS measures are  measures adopted by countries to protect human,
animal or plant life and health from certain enumerated biological and chemical risks.  In broad terms,
the Agreement recognized the right of each Member to adopt SPS measures which provided the level
health and environmental protection that it wished to provide its citizens, but required measures to
be based on a scientific assessment of the risks, to be non-discriminatory, and to be applied only to
the extent necessary to achieve its chosen level of protection.  The SPS Agreement also recognized
certain international standards (those promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius, the International
Organization of Epizootics, or the International Plant Protection Convention) to be benchmark or
"safe harbor" standards -- i.e., a Member that adopted a standard recommended by these
organizations would be "rebuttably presumed" to be in compliance with the Agreement.    
The challenge before the negotiators of the SPS Agreement was to create a set of rules which would
strike the proper balance between allowing protection while disallowing regulatory protectionism.
There are clearly public good arguments that make some SPS restrictions necessary to insure a safe
food supply and protect the domestic environment from pests and diseases.  In other cases,
regulations rationalized on technical grounds seem to lack firm scientific foundations and, at least
from the perspective of exporting countries, seem to be imposed primarily to thwart the commercial
opportunities created by other trade liberalization policies.  That regulatory processes can be
“captured” by domestic producers with a vested interest in limiting competition is well recognized
in the economic theory of regulation, and cases involving the promulgation of SPS measures are no
exception [Roberts and Orden].    If the negotiators were successful, the SPS Agreement will be
regarded as an important institutional  innovation that counterbalances the influences of domestic
interest groups  that successfully lobby for SPS measures which lower net social welfare by restricting
imports that pose negligible health or environmental risks.4
The pivotal question is, did the negotiators achieve the proper balance?  On one side, interested
parties worry that the Agreement seriously threatens national sovereignty in the often emotionally and
politically charged areas of food safety and environmental protection.  Their claim is that under the
Agreement, the standards for crafting SPS measures are too high.  A central concern is that the
Agreement limits the ability of governments to adopt measures in instances where the science may
be immature -- that a government’s evaluation of the likelihood or consequences of a risk associated
with an imported product might not withstand international scrutiny.  On the other side, some major
agricultural exporting countries are troubled that the Agreement appears to allow wide latitude in
adopting SPS measures -- that importing countries may impose measures that impede imports, no
matter how unlikely or how inconsequential the risks.   
This paper examines developments  since the entry  into force of the SPS Agreement in January,
1995, with a view to evaluating the evidence to date that supports the competing views of the SPS
Agreement.  The first section of the paper reviews the origins and principle provisions of the SPS
Agreement itself.  This review sets the stage for an assessment of the first WTO panel decision made
under the SPS Agreement, the longstanding  Hormones dispute, and the subsequent Appellate Body
(AB) ruling.  This evaluation assesses how the case might foreshadow other SPS disputes in the
foreseeable future.  The role that risk assessment played in the dispute is examined in the third section
of the paper, as the perceived success or failure of the Agreement may hinge on whether these
assessments will typically permit judgment about whether there is a “rational relationship” (to use the
AB’s words) between the SPS measure and the risks it mitigates (WTO, 1998).  This paper argues
that one of the principal challenges to effective enforcement of the new WTO disciplines in the near
future may be the current state of risk assessment methodology and practice.   
The fourth section of this paper turns from the landmark Hormones case to consider other U.S.
experiences over the past two years with implementation of the Agreement -- the cases  that
command less attention than prominent disputes but are nonetheless important in gauging whether
the new SPS disciplines have contributed to the effective functioning of the world trading system.
Expanding beyond the U.S. perspective, evidence of the multilateral compliance with the transparency1  GATT 1994 comprises the text of the original 1947 GATT Articles and subsequent
amendments. 
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provisions, which experts agree is key to effective implementation of the Agreement, is reviewed.
The final section presents some tentative concluding remarks, based on the fragmentary evidence
(relative to other trade barriers) available on SPS measures. 
The SPS Agreement -- Origin and Principle Provisions 
The 1994 WTO Agreement continued the historical progression of successive Rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations and GATT case law which have steadily reinforced and periodically augmented
rules disciplining the use of technical restrictions on imports [Roessler].  The principle legal
instruments of the WTO Agreement are the GATT 1994
1 and 15 annexed Agreements.  These
Agreements establish rules for trade measures which affect a wide range of economic activity, from
services to intellectual property, that are important to trade in primary and processed agricultural
goods.  However, three of these Agreements are most relevant for a comprehensive understanding
of the multilateral legal environment for SPS measures in the post Uruguay Round era: the
Agreement on Agriculture (Agriculture Agreement), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement) and the SPS Agreement.  
The Agriculture Agreement itself contains no disciplines on the use of SPS measures, but rather
provides a key motivation for adoption of the disciplines found in the SPS Agreement.  Negotiators
recognized that lowering the level of protection provided by tariffs and many non-tariff barriers
(NTBs) would increase the relative and absolute importance of existing and potential technical
barriers in international markets.  This reduction in protection was especially important in agricultural
markets, since the use of most agricultural NTBs had not been disciplined before the Uruguay Round.
By reducing the ability of governments to protect domestic producers through various other border
and domestic support measures, negotiators feared that the Agriculture Agreement would
inadvertently create an incentive to replace former NTBs with new technical barriers, especially SPS6
measures. The new SPS disciplines were viewed as critical to prevent governments from resorting
to regulatory compensation to appease domestic interests.
The negotiation of the SPS Agreement during the Uruguay Round was also motivated by
shortcomings in the two legal instruments that disciplined the use of SPS measures prior to the Round
--  the original GATT Articles and the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(which was a plurilateral agreement known as the Standards Code).  Although language in these
documents stated that measures could not be “applied in manner which would constitute . . . a
disguised restriction on international trade” or  “create unnecessary obstacles to trade”, the consensus
view that emerged over the years that was that the GATT and the Standards Code had failed to stem
disruptions of trade in international markets caused by proliferating technical restrictions.
In the view of some Members, the unresolved dispute between the United States and the European
Communities (EC) over the EC’s ban on imports of  hormone-treated beef during the 1980s was one
of the more visible failures of the pre-Uruguay Round legal disciplines [Stanton].  In March 1987,
the United States raised the issue of the EC ban under the Standards Code.  When bilateral
consultations failed to resolve the dispute, the United States requested the establishment of a technical
experts group to evaluate the scientific basis for the ban.  This request was denied following the EC
response that the use of growth promotants in beef production was a process and production method
(PPM), and that parties to the Standards Code only had an obligation not to use PPMs to circumvent
the Agreement.  The matter remained unresolved.  In 1989, the United States introduced retaliatory
measures in the form of 100 percent duties on a list of products imported from the EC.  The EC
consequently asked for the establishment of a GATT dispute settlement panel to rule on the legality
of these duties, but the United States denied the request [WTO, 1997].     
Three flaws in the pre-Uruguay Round legal infrastructure blunted the effectiveness of disciplines on
SPS measures and other technical barriers: 1) the lack of a single integrated rule system (sometimes
referred to as “GATT à la carte”); 2) the GATT’s consensus-based dispute settlement process; and2  The sole reference to PPMs in the Standards Code was found in Article 14, which
stipulated that dispute settlement procedures could be invoked in cases where a Party considered
that obligations under the Agreement were being circumvented by the drafting of requirements in
terms of PPMs rather than in terms of characteristics of products.
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3) the arguable exemption of production and process standards from many of the disciplines of the
Standards Code.  Prior to the Uruguay Round, not all signatories of the previous GATT Agreement
had signed the Standards Code, effectively precluding a number of standards-related disputes from
being brought before a GATT panel for resolution.  But even if two countries had signed the
Standards Code, the consensus-based dispute settlement process effectively allowed either country
to block a request to convene a panel or block adoption of a panel report.   Another loophole was
created by the Standard Code’s definition of a measure which would be subject to the disciplines in
the agreement -- “A specification contained in a document which lays down characteristics of a
product such as levels of quality, performance, safety or dimensions” -- which omitted explicit
reference to PPMs.
2
Upon completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, all Members became parties to the WTO’s
single integrated rules system, which includes, among many other things, both the SPS and TBT
Agreements as well as GATT 1994. Moreover, under the new Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding
or DSU), it is no longer possible for a single country to block a dispute ruling or a request for a panel.
The new TBT Agreement now stipulates legally binding rules for “related processes and production
methods” and the SPS Agreement imposes several new substantive and procedural disciplines for a
wide array of health and environmental measures.  
Because the TBT Agreement contains language that refers to protection of human, animal, or plant
life or health, as well as to the protection of the environment, questions arise over the applicable
disciplines for a given measure.  The TBT Agreement covers all technical regulations and conformity
assessment procedures, except when these are sanitary and phytosanitary measures as defined by the
SPS Agreement: those measures that mitigate certain specified risks within the territory of the8
Member (Figure 1).  Knowing the objective of a measure is thus critical to the determination whether
a measure is subject to the disciplines in the TBT or SPS Agreement.  For example, a measure which
proscribes use of an additive might be adopted to safeguard human health (an SPS measure) or to
ensure the compositional integrity of a product (a TBT measure).     
Figure 1: Definition of an SPS measure 
Any measure applied to protect from
human or animal life risks arising from additives, contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing organisms in their
food;
human life plant- or animal-carried diseases (zoonoses);
animal or plant life pests, diseases, or disease-causing organisms;
a country damage caused by the entry, establishment or
spread of pests
Source: Secretariat of the WTO (1996). Understanding the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
Such distinctions matter to regulatory authorities because the SPS Agreement arguably holds
governments to a higher standard than does the GATT 1994 or the TBT Agreement.  For example,
important disciplines which do not explicitly appear in the other two legal instruments are found in
Article 5 (Assessment of Risk and Appropriate Level of SPS Protection) of the SPS Agreement
(Figure 2).  This Article requires, among other things, that any SPS measure be based on an
assessment of risks posed by the import and provide a level of health protection that does not
arbitrarily or unjustifiably vary from the level of health or environmental protection provided by other
measures, if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade.  
Other important disciplines found in the SPS Agreement can be found in Articles 2 (Basic Rights and
Obligations) and 6 (Adaptation to Regional Conditions, Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas 3  Similar disciplines are found in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and are being negotiated as part of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and among Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) participants.
9
Figure 2:  Principle Provisions of the WTO SPS Agreement 
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Article 2 (Basic Rights and Provisions): Members must ensure that SPS measures are applied only
to the extent necessary to safeguard plant, animal and human health, are based on scientific principles,
and are not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.  SPS measures must not discriminate
between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own territory
and that of Members.  
 
Article 3 (Harmonization): Members shall base their SPS measures on international standards,
guidelines or recommendations (where they exist) (3.1), although they may adopt measures that result
in a higher level of protection (3.3), as long as these measures are in accordance with the provisions
of Article 5 (see below).
Article 4 (Equivalence): Members are obliged to recognize that measures adopted by other
Members, although different, provide equivalent levels of protection for plant, animal and human
health, if this is objectively demonstrated by the exporting country.
Article 5 (Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or
Phytosanitary Protection): Members are obliged to base their measures on a risk assessment, taking
into account, when possible and as appropriate, risk assessment methodologies developed under the
auspices of relevant international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the
International Office of Epizootics, and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection
Convention.  Each Member is also obliged, in order to achieve the objective of consistency in the
application of SPS measures, to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of protection
it considers to be appropriate if the distinctions would result in a disguised restriction on international
trade.
Article 6 (Adaption to Regional Conditions, Including Pest- or Disease-Free Areas and Areas of
Low Pest or Disease Prevalence): This provision recognizes that SPS risks do not necessarily
correspond to political borders.  In particular, the Agreement recognizes that pest- or disease-free
areas are largely determined by geographic and other ecological conditions, and therefore may be part
of one country, or all or parts of several countries.  Therefore import protocols must be based on a
risk assessment which evaluates the claims by countries [if made] that certain regions are disease- or
pest- free.
Source:  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994).  THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:  THE LEGAL TEXTS, Geneva.  4    The MFN principle found in Article I stipulates that concessions offered to one trading
partner must be offered to all.  The National Treatment principle codified in Article III holds that
imported products be “accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin” under the importing nation’s laws and regulations.
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and Areas of Low Pest or Disease Prevalence).  Article 2 states that Members must ensure that their
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar
conditions prevail, which includes between their own territory and that of other Members.  These
disciplines are variants of GATT Article I (General Most-Favoured Nation Treatment or MFN) and
GATT Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation)
4, modified as suitable
to the circumstances posed by the biological and chemical risks at issue.  Article 6 of the SPS
Agreement codifies the same modified MFN and National Treatment principles for sub-national units
(i.e., regions) that are free from diseases/pests or where the prevalence of diseases and pests are low.
Article 3 (Harmonization) stipulates that although Members can adopt a measure to provide a higher
level of health or environmental protection than that provided by an existing international standard,
scientific evidence must support that claim.     
Distinguishing protection from protectionism relies on effective decentralized policing of the many
SPS measures that are promulgated each year by WTO Members.  Toward that end, the Agreement
has created several mechanisms to improve the institutional setting for addressing SPS barriers.  The
Agreement establishes a Committee, made up of delegations representing each WTO Member
country, which is charged with developing further SPS guidelines.  Meetings of the Committee, which
occur three or four times a year, likewise present an opportunity for discussion of selected SPS
measures.  The Agreement also permits the Committee to serve as an informal mediator or facilitator
of disputes where the parties mutually agree to hold informal consultations.
The general WTO dispute settlement procedures are available to Members in instances where bilateral
and multilateral technical exchanges have reached an impasse.    If initial consultations do not result
in a mutually agreeable solution between the parties to a dispute, a Member can request a WTO
dispute panel to rule whether the SPS measure is in compliance with the disciplines set forth in the5  Or unless all WTO Member countries (including the complaining Member) convening as
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decide by consensus not to adopt the panel’s report.
6  The information in this section is drawn from the Report of the Panel
(WT/DS26/R/USA), EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): Complaint
by the United States and the Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS48/AB/R) [WTO, 1997 and
WTO, 1998].
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Agreement.  A losing party is obliged to implement the panel’s recommendations and to report on
how it has complied, unless one of the parties appeals the decision
5.  Appeals are limited to issues of
law and legal interpretation by the panel.
The Hormones Dispute
6
Critics of the WTO Agreement in “high level” countries -- countries that have rigorous laws
rigorously enforced -- have voiced concern about the new disciplines in the SPS Agreement [Farber
and Hudec].  These critics argue that the new rules place too great a burden on regulatory authorities
to justify SPS measures, in particular those measures that safeguard human health or the natural
environment.  The perspective of environmental and consumer advocates in these “high-level”
countries is that  the language in the Agreement which encourages governments to use international
standards will inevitably lead to “downward harmonization,” as strict measures which they have
fought long and hard to achieve are successfully challenged by an exporting country before a WTO
dispute panel.  One prominent claim is that the Agreement, with its injunction that an  SPS measure
must be “based on scientific principles and not (be) maintained without sufficient scientific evidence”
fails to make adequate allowance for regulating risks which are imperfectly understood but which
could potentially cause irreversible harm, often referred to as the “precautionary principle.”
 
Farber and Hudec note that the Hormones complaint brought by the United States and Canada
against the EC  is often cited by environmental and consumer groups as a prime example of the  type
of downward pressure that strict food safety and environmental regulations will face in the post-7  The EC Council of Ministers adopted this measure in December, 1985, but it was
challenged in the European Court of Justice, which annulled it on procedural grounds.  The
proposal was re-introduced by the Commission and re-adopted by the Council (Directive 88/146)
on March 16, 1988. 
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Uruguay Round era.  As noted in the previous section, in the 1980s,
7 the EC banned the use of
hormones for growth promotion purposes in domestic cattle herds, and likewise banned imports of
cattle and bovine products that were treated with growth hormones.  The United States and other
beef exporters objected to the ban on imports, arguing that it was a trade barrier thinly disguised as
a health measure.  Pointing to its own record of stringent food safety standards (which allow use of
growth-promoting hormones in cattle), the United States claimed that the EC measure was
unscientific.  The hormone prohibition did not hinge on the presence or absence of residues, the
United States noted, but rather on the use vs. non-use, with a certain intent, of the banned substances.
Upon completion of the Uruguay Round, the United States resurrected its complaint against the EC’s
measure.  As anticipated, formal WTO consultations in 1996 between the United States and the EC
(and subsequently Canada and the EC) failed to produce a mutually acceptable solution to the parties,
and the long-standing Hormones dispute became the bellwether test of the new disciplines in the SPS
Agreement.
The United States and Canada argued that the EC ban  violated disciplines found in Article 2 (Basic
Rights and Obligations), Article 3 (Harmonization) and Article 5 (Assessment of Risk and
Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection) of the SPS
Agreement.  On August 18, 1997 the WTO Panel that heard the dispute found that the EC ban was
inconsistent with four provisions in  the SPS Agreement, and recommended that the EC to bring its
measure into conformity with its obligations under the Agreement. 
Opponents of the SPS Agreement were quick to register their dissatisfaction with the Panel’s report.
Greenpeace, for example, noted that the ruling “impose(d) lowest common denominator health and
environmental standards” and “neglect(ed) fundamental principles underlying present environment8  Including the Lamming Committee which was appointed by the EC Commission to
determine whether the five hormones at issue (all but MGA) could be used in livestock production
without hazard to the public health as well as the ￿￿￿￿ (& 6FLHQWLILF &RQIHUHQFH RQ *URZWK
3URPRWLRQ LQ 0HDW 3URGXFWLRQ￿
9  The JECFA is composed of independent scientists who serve in their individual
capacities as experts, not as representatives of their governments or organizations.  The goal of a
JECFA evaluation of veterinary drugs is to determine safe levels of intake and to recommend
maximum residue limits based on these intake levels.
13
and health policies and regulations such as the precautionary principle”.  Such statements seem to
overlook important features of the actual case.
The case was undeniably complex --  the  365 page ruling includes 204 pages of evidence provided
by six experts (five scientists and the representative from the Codex secretariat) that the Panel
consulted during the proceedings under the terms of Article 13 of the DSU.  Specifically, the United
States and Canada objected to the EC ban on imports of meat and meat products from animals which
had been administered any one of six hormones, alone or in combination, to promote growth.  Three
of the six hormones at issue, oestradiol-17￿, progesterone, and testosterone, are natural hormones
endogenously produced by humans and animals.  The other three hormones involved in the dispute,
trenbolone, zeranol, and melengestrol acetate (MGA), are synthetic hormones that mimic the action
of the three natural hormones.  MGA is a feed additive, while the remaining five hormones are
formulated as pellets designed to be implanted in the ear of the animal (which is discarded at
slaughter).  The hormones are variously used to increase the rate of animal growth (growth
promotion purposes); to synchronize of the estrus cycles of dairy cattle to lower production costs
(zootechnical purposes); or to correct certain endocrine dysfunctions (therapeutic purposes).    
The prima facie scientific case against the EC ban was established by reference to the findings of a
number of studies of the hormones at issue, together with the existence of international standards for
their use (except for MGA).  The United States and Canada pointed out that assessments by experts
over the past four decades, including those by EC’s own experts
8, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA)
9,10    No Codex Member has requested the Codex Commission to establish an international
standard for MGA.
11  The 32nd and 34th (1989) JECFA Reports state that the toxic effects of the two
synthetic hormones, zeranol and trenbolone, are related to their hormonal effect, and therefore
recommended that an Acceptable Daily Intake (and hence an MRL) could be established on the
basis of a no-hormonal-effect level.  The reports noted that the residues that would likely remain
in the meat and organs of cattle treated with the synthetic hormones would fall substantially short
of the levels regarded by the experts as safe.  For example, under the assumption that a 70
kilogram person would consume 500 grams of meat daily over an entire lifetime, the maximum
permissible level of zeranol residues in meat would be 70 µg/kg of edible tissue.  The 32nd Report
notes that when properly administered, maximum mean zeranol residues did not exceed .2 µg/kg
in muscle and 10 µg/kg in liver, which had the highest amount of any tissue examined in the
studies consulted by JECFA.  
12  The 32nd (1988) JECFA Report states that the potential carcinogenic effect of residues
of the three natural  hormones is likewise directly related to their hormonal effect.  Since the
additional residue levels in treated animals have no hormonal effect, according to JECFA, these
residue levels are not capable of exerting any toxic effect.  The residues from exogenously
administered natural hormones, when properly used, would insignificantly increase hormone
exposure beyond background levels in even the most sensitive populations, according to JECFA.  
For example, the 11.4 nanograms of oestrogens found in 500 grams of steer meat implanted with
oestradiol-17￿ are negligible when compared with the daily production of oestrogens by young
boys (41,000 nanograms), an adult man (136,000 nanograms), or a pregnant woman (20,000,000
nanograms). On the basis of this safety assessment, and in view of the difficulty of determining the
levels of residues attributable to the exogenous administration of these hormones for growth
promoting purposes in cattle (because the total residue levels in treated animals fall well within the
normal range of levels found in untreated animals of different types and ages), JECFA concluded
that it was unnecessary to establish MRLs for the three natural hormones.  
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indicated that there is no evidence that six specific hormones pose risks to human health when used
according to good animal husbandry practices.  And in 1995, the Codex Alimentarius Commission
adopted standards for five of the six hormones upon the recommendation of JECFA.
10  Specifically,
the Commission established maximum residue levels (MRLs) for zeranol and trenbolone.
11  It adopted
no MRLs for the three natural hormones as  JECFA had considered them “unnecessary”.
12  Because
there was no international standard for MGA, the U.S. and Canadian case against the EC ban on beef
produced with MGA rested on the argument that the EC had not based its measure on a risk15
assessment.  The complainants pointed out that MGA had been studied extensively during the
regulatory approval process in the United States and Canada, and these studies were in the public
domain.  The EC was entitled to base its measure on these assessments or entitled to prepare its own
assessment based on proprietary data that could be provided by the manufacturer, but it had failed
to do either, the complainants argued.
The EC maintained that the ban afforded a higher level of protection than that provided by the
international standards, a right protected by the SPS Agreement.  The higher level of protection
chosen by the EC for its consumers was “no residues of added hormones for growth promotion.”
Canada and the U.S. countered that this statement constituted a restatement of the EC measure, not
a stated level of protection, and that the EC had not provided scientific evidence to support the claim
that the import ban actually provided a higher level of health protection.  Much of the scientific
evidence that was presented by the EC, the complainants argued, was related to the carcinogenic
potential of entire categories of hormones, or of the hormones at issue in general, but did not
constitute the kind of risk assessment that could inform public health choices related to the use of
hormones as growth promotants in cattle.  For example, Canada and the United States contended that
the scientific evidence presented by the EC on the toxicity of hormones at elevated levels -- amounts
that were equivalent to the amount of hormones that would be found in 11.5 million 500 gram
servings of hormone-treated beef  -- could not be considered as an actual evaluation of risks from
consuming beef treated with hormones.
The United States and Canada also produced evidence to support their allegation that the EC ban
resulted in arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions in levels of health protection that resulted in trade
discrimination or a disguised barrier to trade.  Both parties provided information to facilitate
comparison of the effects of the use of the three natural and three synthetic hormones to promote
growth in beef cattle with 1) the endogenous levels of natural hormones in other foods, including
untreated beef; 2) the use of natural hormones for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes; and 3) the
use of carbadox in the EC to promote growth in pigs.   16
Endogenous level of natural hormones in other foods.   The United States and Canada argued that
the infinitesimal residues that remained in meat treated with growth hormones was far below the  
Table 1: Comparative oestrogen intakes from food sources
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levels found naturally in other foods (Table 1).  Evidence submitted by the complainants indicated,
for example, that the oestrogen content of one egg was equivalent to 76.5 kg of implanted steer beef.
If the EC were genuinely concerned with the health effects of these hormonal substances, the
complainants argued, the EC Commission should be regulating eggs and cabbage as well as beef
produced with these hormones. 
Use of natural hormones for therapeutic/zootechnical purposes.  Although the EC’s regulatory
action is frequently cast as “a ban on hormones”, the EC does allow use of the three natural hormones
for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes.  The EC argued that these uses would result in lower
residues than those that would remain after using hormones for growth promoting purposes.  The
scientists that the Panel consulted during the proceedings testified that there was no qualitative
difference between the residues in beef treated with hormones for growth promotion purposes and
residues in beef treated with hormones for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes.  The scientists also
agreed that the quantity of residues would vary with the amount administered, either for growth17
promotion or for therapeutic/zootechnical purposes, and noted that no matter how small the doses,
or how long the withdrawal period before slaughter, some molecules would remain in the animal
(normally at undetectable levels).  The biological persistence of these compounds complicated any
claims that might have been made that the EC ban was aimed at protecting consumers from any
exposure to hormones in their food over and above the levels which occur in nature.  Presumably this
was why the EC argued that its level of protection for its consumers was “no residues of added
hormones for growth promotion.”
The use of carbadox.  The fact that the EC allows the use of carbadox, a feed additive, to promote
growth in swine provided additional evidence that EC food safety measures resulted in unjustifiable
and arbitrary distinctions in levels of health protection, according to U.S.-Canadian arguments.  The
complainants pointed out that, according to the 36th JECFA report, carbadox is a known genotoxic
(cancer inducing) carcinogen, unlike the six hormones at issue (which may, at elevated levels,
promote but not induce cancer), and for that reason the Codex Commission had declined to establish
an MRL for this compound.  The United States argued that the EC’s decision to allow the sale and
consumption of meat from animals to which carbadox had been administered was but one example
of a food safety standard that was less stringent than the one adopted for the six hormones at issue.
The United States contended that the reason for this difference was that the EC swine industry was
more efficient than the beef sector.  It was no coincidence, the United States argued, that EC officials
were willing to allow the use of productivity-enhancing inputs in the internationally competitive pork
sector, but substantially more conservative about allowing the use of such inputs in a sector which
relied on costly domestic price support measures, import protection, and export subsidies to maintain
producer profitability. 
Throughout the proceedings, the United States and Canada had drawn attention to the possible
economic motives behind the ban.  The complainants noted that in April, 1984, the EC had introduced
milk quotas to reduce the oversupply of milk, which resulted in an increase in cattle slaughter.  EC
intervention stocks of beef, which were slightly less than 400,000 tons in November 1983 increased
to over 800,000 tons by the end of 1985, the year the EC Commission drafted Directive 85/640 which18
banned the use of hormones for growth promoting purposes.  A ban on the sale of domestic or
imported bovine products that were treated with growth promoting hormones provided EC officials
with a seductive solution, the complainants argued.  A ban justified on food safety grounds would
simultaneously  reduce productivity in the domestic beef sector and reduce imports from some of the
world’s most competitive beef exporters.  The United States and Canada testified that the value of
their annual export sales of bovine products to Europe had fallen by more than several hundred
million dollars when the ban went into effect.    
The Panel ultimately concurred with most of the arguments made by the complainants.  The Panel
found that the EC ban on imported beef treated with hormones for growth-promotion purposes was
inconsistent with its obligations under the SPS Agreement, specifically that: 1) it was not based on
a risk assessment (Article 5.1); 2) it was not based on existing international standards (Article 3.1);
3) the EC had not presented evidence that constituted a scientific justification for the ban which the
EC claimed resulted in a higher level of protection than that provided by the international standard
(Article 3.3); and 4) the EC ban on beef produced with hormones for growth-promoting  purposes
provided a level of protection that arbitrarily or unjustifiably varied from the level of protection
provided by other EC measures,  and this distinction had resulted in a disguised restriction on trade
(Article 5.5). 
    
At the conclusion of their report, the Panelists suggested that a voluntary labeling regime might
constitute an acceptable compromise in this dispute, but none of the parties to the dispute have
publicly endorsed the labeling option to date.  The argument in favor of voluntary labeling is that
consent criteria and minority rights imply that public policy should permit a minority to avoid the
consumption of foods that are questionable in their opinion.  The opposing view is that labels can
inadvertently stigmatize a product, and good public policy should not implicitly suggest that there is
some health risk associated with consumption of a food if scientific evidence does not support that
view [Thompson]. 19
It is significant to note that the EC invoked the precautionary principle at several points in its defense
of the ban.  Specifically it argued that a Member was entitled under the SPS Agreement to adopt bans
or similar conservative risk management protocols even if the weight or the preponderance of
scientific evidence indicated that a substance posed negligible risks.  The EC argued that in adopting
its precautionary approach, it was putting the interests of consumers ahead of the commercial
interests of farmers and pharmaceutical companies.  However, throughout the proceedings, the EC
failed to defend its measure under Article 5.7, a codification of  the precautionary principle in the SPS
Agreement.  This Article states that “In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available
pertinent information . . .”
The SPS Agreement thus clearly permits the precautionary taking of measures when a government
considers that sufficient scientific evidence does not exist to permit a final decision on the safety of
a product or process.  It also permits immediate measures to be taken in an emergency situation, as
many countries did in 1996 when scientists in the United Kingdom announced that they could not rule
out that bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) could be transmissible to humans.  However, the
EC considered its ban final, not provisional, and was therefore unwilling to formally defend it under
the terms of Article 5.7.  The Panel concurred with the complainants that the EC measure must
therefore be consistent with the obligations specified in the other Articles of the Agreement. 
The EC notified its intention to appeal this panel report on September 24, 1997, on a wide range of
procedural and substantive issues.  The United States and Canada cross-appealed the finding, arguing
that the Panel should have also found that the EC ban was inconsistent with Article 2.2 (the measure
was maintained without sufficient scientific evidence) and Article 5.6 (that measures should not be
more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve the level of protection chosen by a Member). 
The AB released its report in January, 1998, ruling on fourteen issues that had been raised by the
three appellants.  The AB concurred with the Panel that the EC measure was not in conformity with13     It  also concluded that the Panel had exercised appropriate judicial economy in not
making a determination whether the EC’s measure was in conformity with Articles 2.2 and 5.6 of
the SPS Agreement, thereby turning down the request made in the U.S. and Canadian appeals.
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all of the SPS Agreement disciplines and recommended that the DSB request the EC to bring its
measure into conformity with the treaty.  Specifically, it upheld the Panel’s findings that the EC’s
measure was not based on a risk assessment, and that while the EC was entitled to adopt a measure
which provided a higher level of protection than the Codex standards, it had not produced scientific
evidence to support the claim that the ban actually did so.  Significantly, the AB did overturn two
findings by the Panel, ruling that the EC’s ban had not been shown to violate the obligation to base
measures on  international standards (where they exist), or that the ban had provided a level of
protection that arbitrarily and unjustifiably varied from other EC food safety measures such that the
variation resulted in a disguised restriction on trade.
13 
In the first deviation from the original Panel, the AB held that the statement in the SPS Agreement
that a measure shall be based on an international standard where one exists (except as otherwise
provided for in the agreement) does not imply that measures need to conform to international
standards.  If this were so, contended the AB, the SPS Agreement would vest international standards
(which are recommendations under the terms of the Codex Commission) with obligatory force and
effect.  To sustain such an assumption, the AB argued, language far more specific and compelling
than that found in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement would be necessary.  
The AB also disagreed with the Panel’s finding that the EC ban provided a level of protection that
arbitrarily and unjustifiably differed from levels provided by other measures, when such differences
result in a disguised restriction on trade.  The AB noted that while the EC does not regulate
hormones in  cabbage or eggs while regulating hormone-treated beef, this difference was not arbitrary
or unjustifiable.  In the view of the AB, there is a fundamental distinction between added hormones
(natural or synthetic) and naturally occurring hormones.  To regulate the latter would entail a
comprehensive and massive governmental intervention in nature, reducing the comparison itself to
an “absurdity” in the view of the AB.  The judges also concurred with the EC that the distinction21
drawn between using natural hormones for therapeutic/zootechnical purposes and for growth
promoting purposes was not arbitrary.  The AB reasoned that although it is empirically impossible
to monitor the quantity of exogenously administered natural hormones for growth promotion
purposes because of endogenously produced background levels, consumers would be exposed to
greater amounts of hormones if allowed for use as growth promotants.  Growth-promoting hormones
were administered continuously (by means of an ear implant) and over long periods of time (most of
the lifespan of the animals involved), the AB argued, while hormones would be administered but once
a year for zootechnical purposes. 
The AB agreed with the Panel that the evident distinction between the regulation of carbadox and the
regulation of hormone treated beef in the EC was indeed arbitrary and unjustifiable.  However,  the
judges disagreed that this distinction constituted a disguised restriction on trade.  The AB argued that
the import prohibition could not have been designed simply to protect beef producers in the EC vis-à-
vis beef producers in the United States and Canada, because the ban on the use of hormones applied
to EC producers as well.  Likewise, the AB took note of the legislative history of the measure, which
documented the depth and extent of EC consumer concerns over 1) the results of general scientific
studies on the carcinogenicity of hormones, and  2) the dangers of veterinary drug misuse which were
brought to the attention of the public because of scandals related to the black market in these drugs
in Europe.  The AB concluded that a measure which would allay the fears of EC consumers would
have the effect of increasing the consumption of beef within the Communities, which would be in the
interest of farmers who produced hormone-free beef in exporting countries as well as EC farmers.
The EC has notified the WTO DSB that it intends to implement the findings of the Panel and AB
reports.  However, this long-standing dispute has yet to draw to a close.  Press releases from the
parties to the dispute indicate that the principles are still some distance apart in their interpretation
of what constitutes “implementation” or a reasonable period of time for implementation.  For
example, the EC has indicated that it first intends to carry out a lengthy risk assessment before it
decides on whether to lift the ban.  The United States and Canada have countered that conducting22
yet another risk assessment does not constitute implementation of the WTO decisions.  At the
moment, these matters are still under discussion.    
What can be said of the legacy of this landmark dispute?  First, that it provides supporting evidence
for the observation by legal scholars that the hardest cases for WTO dispute panels will involve
facially neutral measures --- measures that appear to apply equally to domestic and foreign producers.
Adjudicating disputes over regulatory measures also presents a “delicate challenge” for tribunals
because their decisions can be viewed as an implicit finding that the stated justification of the measure
at issue was not its actual purpose [Farber and Hudec].  And in SPS cases, a decision can be
interpreted as a judgment about the competency of a Member’s official scientific establishment, as
well as its motives.
Controversy over panel decisions can be compounded in cases such as the Hormones dispute, where
the measure at issue could be viewed as a hybrid of  protection (a crisis management decision) and
protectionism (an economically expedient decision).  However convenient the ban on hormone-
treated beef may have eventually been for EC authorities seeking to reduce expenditures on disposal
of intervention stocks of beef, it must be acknowledged that the original ban was proposed to allay
public anxieties that emerged in the early 1980's following widely publicized reports of the “estrogen
scandal” in Italy when residues of the illegal growth promotant DES were found in manufactured
baby food.  
Studies indicate that the occurrence of a low probability, high consequence event can cause the
public’s estimate of the probability of the re-occurrence of the event to be biased upward, thereby
fomenting demand for stricter regulations [Camerer and Kunreuther].  Although experts, focused on
the statistical measurement of risk likelihood, may not concur with public opinion about the need for
revision of technical measures in such circumstances, regulators have sometimes decided to design
policies that reflect public risk perceptions, defending their choices by pointing to the democratic
foundations of their actions.      14 Quarantine pests and diseases are defined by the international standard setting
organizations as those which are not present in the importing country, or are present, but under
official control programs.
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Successful challenges of  measures whose most visible advocates are consumer or environmental
groups rather than domestic producers, such as the measures at issue in both Hormones and
Tuna/Dolphin I and II,  can quickly undermine popular support of trade liberalization efforts
[Hoekman and Leidy].  The general public (and their public representatives) can regard broad claims
by environmental and consumer activists that the WTO Agreement lowers food safety or threatens
marine mammals as credible because they are not perceived as personally gaining from the import
restriction at issue.  The technical complexity of these cases can make refutation of these claims
difficult for free trade advocates.
A review of the disputes that will be heard in the near future suggests that a case  with the emotional
dimensions of the Hormones dispute will not likely emerge in 1998.  Both of the next two cases to
be heard, the Australian-Canadian Salmon dispute and  the Japan-U.S. Varietal Testing dispute
involve facially discriminatory measures that are justified on the basis of protecting, respectively,
animals and plants from quarantine
14 pests and diseases (Table 2).





EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones)
United States and Canada Appellate Body Report
Adopted
Australian Measures Affecting the Importation of
Salmon
Canada
(United States & EC)
Active Panel
Japanese Varietal Testing Requirements United States
(EC, Hungary, Brazil)
Active Panel 
Korean Measures Concerning Inspection of
Agricultural Products
United States Pending Consultations15  A study of the use of trade measures against foreign environmental practices points out
that the more controversial measures adopted or proposed by the EC and the United States have
involved essentially moral objections to killing or mistreatment of animals, such as dolphins and
the use of leghold traps.  The author notes that the justification for these controversial measures is
some distance from the conventional justification (threat of serious, immediate and irreversible
harm to the global ecosystem) for the use of environmental trade measures [Hudec].
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U.S. Measures Affecting Poultry Imports from the
EC
EC Pending Consultations
Korean Shelf-life Measures United States Settled Case
Korean Measures Concerning Bottled Water Canada Settled Case
1 Distinct issues.
Also diminishing the contentiousness of these disputes is that while they could be broadly seen as
“environmental” issues, the disputed measures do not involve controversial protection of favored
species.
15  In fact, the Varietal Testing dispute involves Japanese conformity assessment procedures
for judging the efficacy of methyl bromide treatments on fruit, a cause that the environmental
community will probably not rush to embrace.  The only other complaint involving a facially neutral
food safety measure at the present time is the EC complaint again U.S. poultry process standards
enacted in 1997.  As the EC exported little more than $1 million in poultry products to the United
States before current measures were adopted, it is unlikely that this case will be perceived as a
significant threat to U.S. public health.   
The Role of Risk Assessment in the SPS Agreement
The debate over whether the Panel and AB’s decisions in the Hormones dispute could be interpreted
as evidence in support of the view that the multilateral disciplines on SPS measures are either too
stringent or too lax will likely overlook the one of the principle lessons of the case -- the fact that risk
assessments may not only serve as the normative basis for SPS decisions in the post-Uruguay Round
era, but will also constitute key evidence in SPS disputes.  The Hormones dispute highlighted the fact16  A definition of risk assessment, in addition to factors that should be considered in a risk
assessment are found in Articles 5.1 through 5.3 of the SPS Agreement.
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that risk assessment as typically performed by regulatory bodies may make judgement about a
measure’s conformity with the SPS disciplines difficult.
Risk assessment is a vehicle for interpreting and characterizing scientific evidence, and involves
hazard identification, an estimate of the likelihood of a hazard, and an evaluation of the consequences
of the hazard should it occur
16.  Assessments are usually oriented toward the evaluation of a single
target exposure that can be regarded as providing an acceptably small risk -- which involves a mixture
of scientific analysis, scientific opinion, and value judgments -- rather than evaluating a number of risk
management alternatives that provide an array of different benefits and costs for national authorities
to consider [Kopp, Krupnick, and Toman].  
Whether by default or design, most assessments of hazards are either binary (safe or not safe) or
qualitative (negligible risks, no appreciable risk) rather than quantitative.  This complicates evaluation
of claims that measures provide a higher level of protection -- can a measure that is apparently more
stringent than an international standard be safer than safe?  The two questions that such assessments
raise is what is the definition of “safe”? and what are the assumptions that underpin the determination
of  “safe”?  With respect to the first question, it has been observed that risk assessments often provide
end points which mean little to policymakers or the general public, but which are more easily
measurable from a biological standpoint.  How should one weigh an infinitesimal increment in the
number of cells that could potentially promote cancer, given that thousands or millions of these cells
are produced by the body itself on a daily basis or occur naturally in beef and other foods?  It is
notable that the one estimate of a “statistical death” that could be associated with consumption of
hormone-treated beef that emerged from the Hormones dispute was not provided by any of the
parties to the dispute, but by one of the experts consulted by the Panel, who made the following
statement during the proceedings:17  The same expert put this estimate into context, noting that about 110,000 of every
million women will develop breast cancer.  It is estimated that several thousand of the 110,000
breast cancer cases would be related to the total intake of exogenous oestrogens from every
source, including foods such as eggs and meat, as well as from pharmaceuticals, such as the use of
oestrogens for family planning purposes or hormonal replacement.  
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“. . .the accompanying risk that would be associated by consuming meat containing
residues would be extraordinarily small.  It would be very hard on scientific grounds
to say that the risk was zero.  But it is likely to be very, very small.  It could be zero.
It could be as high by estimates [sic] as one cancer in a million people exposed to
them over their lifetime.  So the risk, to sum up those comments, is somewhere
between zero and somewhere around one in a million.
17  And that one in a million is
a very difficult number to pin down.  A lot of assumptions go into it.”
Without such recognizable end points, panelists will find it difficult to determine whether an SPS
measures is, in the words of the AB,  “sufficiently supported or reasonably warranted” by the risk
assessment.  
        
The assumptions that underpin determinations of “safe” will also likely be regarded as important
information by panelists, if only because defending Members can be expected to argue that any
violation of these assumptions therefore renders a measure “unsafe”.  The standard practice in risk
assessment methodology is to employ conservative risk assessment assumptions to compensate for
gaps in field data that may unavailable on ex ante basis.  For example, the Codex ADI and MRLs for
the hormones at issue in the Hormones dispute are based on an exposure assumption that the
consumer will consume 500 grams of hormone-treated beef over an entire lifetime so as to provide
a safety factor that would sufficiently mitigate risks associated with intentional or unintentional
misuse.   And notwithstanding the testimony of one the scientific experts in the Hormones dispute,
who stated that the 32nd JECFA report indicated that a concentrated intravenous injection of 100
times the recommended dose of the hormones under study resulted in residues that  reached only 15 -
16 percent of ADIs, the EC repeatedly raised questions about the safety of hormones when they were
not used according to “good agricultural practice.”  The AB noted that the risk that is to be evaluated18  The Cooperator Program at FAS includes approximately 40 groups representing
specific U.S. commodity sectors such as horticultural products, feed grains, wheat, soybeans, and
rice.  These groups are funded by their members, primarily agricultural producers and processors. 
FAS and the cooperators share in the cost of overseas market development activities.
19 These agencies include the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the
Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS), and the
Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA).
20 The USDA survey results provide the most comprehensive view  to date of regulatory
regimes facing an important agricultural exporting nation.  Questionable technical barriers were
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in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating
under strictly controlled conditions, but also, “ the actual potential for adverse effects on human
health in the real world where people live and work and die.”  Shortcomings in the previous risk
assessments, the EC argues, provide sufficient justification for completing a new assessment, rather
than basing any potential revisions of their current measure on existing evaluations.
It is widely recognized that although the bounds of uncertainty for risks assessment of chemical
stressors (such as hormones and other additives) may span multiple orders of magnitude, the
principles, methods, data, and conventions for chemical risk assessment are far more developed than
for biological risk assessment [Powell].  Powell notes that there may be “large, irreducible
uncertainties in predicting the effects of biological stressors” because they 1) grow, reproduce, and
may multiply; 2) actively and passively disperse; 3) interact with ecosystems in unpredictable ways;
and 4) randomly evolve.  This observation is important in view of recent data collected by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture on foreign technical barriers.
In 1996, USDA asked field personnel in its Foreign Agriculture Service (FAS) and producer groups
that participate in the FAS Cooperator Program
18  to identify questionable foreign technical measures
that threatened, constrained or blocked U.S. exports of primary and processed agricultural, forestry
and fishery products.  This information was subsequently vetted by scientists and analysts in USDA’s
regulatory agencies
19  who recommended deletion of identified barriers in the data set that were
judged to be in conformity with international legal commitments, such as the WTO Agreement.
20reported for 62 countries.  Over 300 market restrictions were identified that threatened,
constrained or blocked $4.97 billion of U.S. agricultural exports, 7.1 percent of the $69.7 billion
1996 export value of the covered products.  A detailed description of the survey design in
addition to summary descriptive statistics of foreign technical barriers to U.S. agricultural exports
can be found in Roberts and DeRemer (1997).   Summaries of the aggregated survey results are
also provided in Thornsbury, Roberts, DeRemer and Orden (forthcoming). 
21  The dollar totals sum to more than $4.97 billion because some restrictions span
regulatory goals, and are therefore counted twice.
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The measures identified in the survey were dominated by SPS barriers (Table 3), particularly those
addressing commercial plant and animal heath issues (210 barriers affecting trade of $3.02 billion) and
food safety (76 barriers affecting $ 2.36 billion
21).  All of the measures justified on the basis of
protecting production agriculture and most (47) of the measures in the food safety category mitigate
risks associated with biological hazards.
Table 3: Foreign SPS barriers to U.S. agricultural exports by regulatory goal of measure and by importer
income status 
(Number of restrictions)









Low Income 27 5 --
Lower Middle Income 41 15 1
Upper Middle Income 59 22 --
High Income 83 34 5
Total 210 76 6
1As defined by the World Bank
2 Eight of the countries in this sample, most notably China and Russia, are not yet WTO Members.22  The Group of Eight (or “G-8") Members that most actively participated in the
negotiation of the SPS Agreement were: Argentina, Australia, Canada, the EC, Japan, New
Zealand, Thailand, and the United States.
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It is not known how robust the profile of regulatory regimes that emerges from the USDA survey
results is across countries.  Another major net agricultural exporter may face a substantially different
distribution of questionable regulatory regimes if the commodity composition of its exports varies
from that of the United States.  The destination of exports is also likely to be a relevant factor -- a
country that exports primarily to developing countries may face different regimes than one that ships
to markets in North America, Japan, and Europe.  But even in view of these uncertainties, it does not
seem unreasonable to predict that many SPS disputes in coming years will center on different
assessments of risks posed by biological stressors such as noxious weeds, yield-reducing arthropods,
or food-borne microbial pathogens.  The current state of biological  risk analysis methodology could
therefore represent one of the principle challenges facing the SPS Agreement in the coming years. 
The SPS Agreement as a Catalyst for Regulatory Reform
Legal scholars have noted that while it is potentially constructive to have the SPS Agreement and the
new WTO dispute settlement procedures in place, their formal existence does not guarantee that
greater discipline will be imposed on disingenuous use of SPS barriers [Abbott].  Nonetheless, one
hope of the Agreement has been that the enunciation of the principles for SPS regulations and the
mere existence of binding adjudicatory mechanisms will prompt unilateral reconsideration of some
SPS measures or contribute to negotiated resolution of some disagreements without recourse to
lengthy, and sometimes fractious, dispute settlement proceedings. 
As anticipated, evidence is accumulating that suggests that, at least in the G-8 countries that led the
SPS negotiations
22, regulatory authorities in several instances are either unilaterally modifying
regulations to comply with the Agreement or voluntarily modifying regulations after technical bilateral
exchanges.   For example, the United States’ recent adoption of its “regionalization regulation” is30
a significant departure from its long-standing practice of only recognizing entire countries as “free”
or “not free” of a particular disease [Ahl and Acree].  This regulatory action has allowed imports of
uncooked beef from regions in Argentina that have been recognized as aftosa-free into the United
States for the first time in 80 years.  And after three years of bilateral technical exchanges and joint
research, the United States recently replaced its controversial 83-year ban on imports of Mexican
avocados with a process standard which will allow avocados from a specified region in Mexico to be
exported to the northeastern United States during the winter months.  Similar examples of an
accelerated schedule for “upgrading” SPS measures in the G-8 countries, including Japan’s
acceptance of U.S. tomatoes and Australia’s acceptance of cooked poultry meat, can likewise be
found.  Although in all of these cases, a finding by regulatory scientists that an import protocol could
be designed to reduce risks to negligible levels was a necessary condition, it was no doubt easier to
enact these changes within the new framework of multilateral SPS disciplines which provided
policymakers with the assurance that the measures of trading partners would likewise be obliged to
conform to the same principles.   
Members have also used the forum provided by the SPS Committee to air grievances over SPS
measures when bilateral technical exchanges have reached an impasse.  The opportunity to elucidate
the details of a regulations and its enforcement before other Members has sometimes led to the
correction of erroneous accounts of trade barriers reported by industry sources.  In other cases, these
discussions have served to pinpoint the source of disagreement between trading partners.  On
occasion, when Committee exchanges have failed to produce results that are satisfactory to both
parties, Members have requested formal WTO consultations.  These consultations have, in some
instances, obviated the need for referring the matter to a WTO panel.
South Korea’s change in policy regarding government mandated shelf-life standards provides one
example where formal consultations led to a negotiated settlement (Table 2).  The U.S. government
questioned the scientific basis for uniform shelf-life requirements during WTO consultations with
South Korea in May, 1995.  Three months later, the two governments notified the WTO that they
had reached a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute: South Korea agreed to allow31
manufacturers of frozen foods and vacuum-packed meat to set their own use-by dates.  Formal
consultations may also successfully resolve the 1996 complaint by the United States against some of
Korea’s inspection measures that result in port delays that greatly exceed the norm in Asia.  To date,
Korea has modified some, but not all, of the measures at issue.  The United States is currently
monitoring the progress that Korea is making on implementation of the pledged reforms.
However, it is the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement that offer the greatest promise of
effective implementation of the new disciplines.  Transparency provisions for regulatory measures are
particularly important in view of the fact that exporters often report that complying with an
undocumented  de facto measure is a significant impediment to gaining access to a market.  Annex
B of the SPS Agreement details the new transparency obligations of WTO members which include:
1) notification of an enquiry point which is responsible for provision of answers to all reasonable
inquiries from interested Members as well as for the provision of relevant documents (usually a copy
of the actual regulation or a summary of it in one of the three official languages of the WTO); 2)
notification of the notification authority, the single central government authority responsible for
notifying SPS measures to the WTO Secretariat; and 3) notification of proposed modifications to
existing SPS regulations or new SPS measures that could affect international trade so as to allow
comment by Members before they are adopted.
The requirement to notify trading partners of changes in SPS measures -- together with the
requirement to base SPS decisions on a risk assessment -- underpin the monitoring system established
by the Agreement to facilitate decentralized policing of the many SPS measures that are promulgated
each year by WTO Members.  On the notification form, Members are asked to provide a justification
of the measure, explicitly identify the products to which it applies, and note whether it conforms to
an international standard (if one exists).
Two years after the entry into force of the Agreement, complete transparency still remains a goal.
More than half of the Members have not yet notified a single SPS measure, although all the
transparency disciplines have been obligatory for all Members since the entry into force for the23  Other provisions of the Agreement are not obligatory for least-developing countries
until 2000.
24  The Commission of the EC notifies EC-wide SPS regulations, but individual Member
States notify measures that fall outside of the competence of the Commission.   
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Agreement (Table 4).
23  Most of these Members, as could have been anticipated, are low or lower-
middle income countries.  It is encouraging to note that the major agricultural importing and
exporting Members are conscientiously observing the transparency obligations.  Together these 52
Members have notified a total of 724 measures during the first two years that the Agreement has been
in force.    Many of those Members in the upper middle and high income  categories that have not yet
notified an SPS measure are Member States of the EC
24 or small economies whose actions are
unlikely to perturb international markets.




Non-Notifying Members Notifying Members Number of Measures
Low Income 34 6 15
Lower Middle Income 21 17 87
Upper Middle Income 10 10 218
High Income 15 19 404
Total 80 52 724
1 As defined by the World Bank
Source: WTO (G/SPS/W/50, G/SPS/GN/11, AND G/SPS/GEN/48) and author’s calculations.
It is too early to judge if  the transparency provisions of the SPS Agreement will significantly curb
regulatory protectionism, but in the short run, its contribution to promoting symmetry of information
among Members, many of whom are developing countries that are highly dependent upon the import
and export of raw and semiprocessed agricultural products, should be recognized.  For example, the
EC’s recent notification of a proposed regulation to lower maximum residue levels for aflatoxin in
a wide range of foodstuffs (together with new testing regimes to detect these lower levels) prompted33
comment from a large number of  Members, including Senegal, The Gambia, India, Brazil, and The
Philippines.  Under other circumstances, these Members may have had difficulty in learning about the
details of the regulation at the proposal stage, either to raise questions about the measure or to
prepare for its eventual adoption.34
Concluding Remarks
The outcome of the highly visible Hormones dispute is likely to dominate any judgment in the near
term about whether the SPS Agreement (and jurisprudence which interprets that Agreement) has
struck the proper balance in disciplining the use of SPS measures.  If one understands “proper
balance” as a dispute settlement outcome that both consumer/environmental advocates and free-trade
advocates could alternately support and criticize, then the Agreement has achieved its objective. 
Those who voiced concerns that the SPS Agreement would promote “downward harmonization” of
national standards are likely pleased that the AB ruled that international standards are not obligatory
under the terms of the Agreement.  And although the Agreement’s  recognition of the “precautionary
principle” is not likely broad enough to please some, the case also highlighted the fact that the SPS
negotiators made provision for the adoption of conservative SPS measures to mitigate unfamiliar risks
on a temporary basis.  On the other hand, the Panel and AB findings put Members on notice that
although measures may apply equally to domestic and foreign producers -- and are therefore in
compliance with the National Treatment principle -- there still must be a “rational relationship”
between the measure and the risks it supposedly mitigates, which some will consider to be an
unacceptable affront to national sovereignty.
Those who saw the EC hormone ban as a vexing example of a nontransparent trade barrier that
escaped discipline before the Uruguay Round are likely satisfied with the effectiveness of the new
SPS disciplines in view of the Panel and AB rulings.  However, confidence in the effectiveness of the
Agreement could be seriously eroded if compliance with a ruling that a measure is “not based on a
risk assessment” can be interpreted as a requirement to perform a risk assessment without changing
the measure at issue.  At this time, any judgment about the SPS Agreement that rests on the outcome
of the Hormones  dispute is complicated by the fact that it is not yet known how the EC will fulfill
its obligation to bring its measure into conformity with the Agreement.         
As legal scholars have repeatedly observed (and the Hormones dispute outcome illustrates), the
effectiveness of the new WTO/GATT “hard law” (specific rules, quasi-judicial) system still depends35
fundamentally on the political will of WTO Members to comply with legal discipline over their
policies.  In the case of the SPS Agreement, that will has been revealed in a number of politically
costly unilateral and negotiated regulatory decisions made by authorities in both net agricultural
exporting and importing countries over the past two years.  But if political will is the necessary
condition, it was evidently not a sufficient condition prior to the Uruguay Round.  The principles and
the institutional mechanisms established by the Agreement are therefore credited with being an
important contributing factor in prompting or prodding Members to revise some restrictive SPS
policies which have eased strains in bilateral trade relations, notably between the United States and
East Asia, and the United States and Latin America.
Compliance with the transparency provisions of the Agreement may weigh heavily in future
evaluations of whether the Agreement has made a significant contribution to the liberal international
trading system.  Changes in regulatory regimes, which track changes in production, processing, and
detection/eradication technologies, are the norm, not the exception, and these changes will likely
continue to spawn disagreements between importers and exporters.  In this context, the continuing
injunction to base measures on a risk assessment and to notify one’s trading partners of proposed SPS
measures, requirements which “increase the costs of self-serving or scientifically dubious decision
making and thus discourage it” [Sykes] could make a sizable (albeit, difficult to measure) contribution
to the multilateral trading system.  Gauging this contribution will entail weighing whether an ounce
of prevention has produced a pound of cure.
Further study of individual SPS measures will provide evidence about the degree to which the SPS
disciplines contribute to good economic policy.  True, Members have revised some conservative risk
management protocols over the past two years, but in many instances these changes have been
modest.  While the Agreement requires a measure to be based on “scientific principles” and on
“sufficient scientific evidence”, nothing in the Agreement requires countries to enact only those
measures whose “benefits” outweigh the “costs”.  The new SPS disciplines emphasize the use of pest-
or disease-related costs associated with imports as a normative basis for regulatory decisions.  The
Agreement thus appears to be firmly rooted in a risk assessment paradigm, which embeds value36
judgments about “acceptable” risks into regulatory policies, rather than an economic paradigm in
which normative rules for designing SPS measures rests on cost-benefit analysis to infer appropriate
levels of protection from individual preferences.  In many cases sound science is compatible with
sound economics, but in others, SPS regulations may have net economic costs even if they have solid
scientific justification.  Two recent studies of quarantine policies -- the U.S. geographic/seasonal ban
on Mexican avocados and the Australian ban on bananas -- underscore the point that restrictive
phytosanitary measures can produce consumer welfare losses that exceed the domestic costs of
possible pest infestations [Orden and Romano; James and Anderson].  These cases are not unusual.
James and Anderson observe that “SPS policy assessment currently is about where environmental
policy assessment was two or three decades ago.” 
A larger question is whether the SPS Agreement could actually hinder efforts to base SPS measures
on economic efficiency criteria if policymakers chose to do so.  This issue is addressed in one recent
paper which examines whether the legal obligations found in SPS Agreement are wholly congruent
with welfare analysis guidelines that have been promulgated in various regulatory reform initiatives
in the United States and other developed countries over the past few years [Roberts].  This study
notes that the Agreement is ambiguous about the standing that [trade] benefits should have in SPS
regulatory decisionmaking, creating uncertainty about the WTO-legality of measures based on cost-
benefit analysis in some circumstances.  However, any divergence between what economists would
recommend and what the Agreement might proscribe may eventually be seen to be more apparent
than real.  Over time, one can anticipate that further research, drawing on evidence provided by
unilateral policy choices and future dispute panel decisions, will permit more substantive judgement
about how well the legal principles of the WTO/GATT system function to address SPS measures, and
how might they be improved.  37
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